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Abstract 
The democratic peace is one of the most robust findings in international relations. Yet it suffers 
from two important limitations. First, even those who fully embrace the democratic peace have 
difficulty precisely identifying which facet of democracy drives the result. Second, the vast 
majority of studies have relied on a single measure of democracy – the Polity index. This paper 
reassesses interstate conflict on several new measures of democracy and their disaggregated 
components from the Varieties of Democracy project in a global sample of 173 countries from 
1900–2010 (www.v-dem.net). We theorize three distinct mechanisms of constraint that may 
explain why some countries do not engage in military conflict with each other: formal vertical 
(e.g. elections), informal vertical (e.g. civil society activism), and horizontal accountability (e.g. 
interbranch constraint on the executive). We find that the formal vertical channels of 
accountability provided by elections are not as crucial as horizontal constraint and the informal 
vertical accountability provided by a strong civil society. 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
The democratic peace has proved to be one of the most influential and durable findings in the 
history of international relations, if not political science as a whole. The foundational studies by 
Bremer (1992) and Maoz and Russett (1993) have both netted over 1000 citations on Google 
Scholar.1 And while some alternative explanations have been offered such as the ‘capitalist 
peace’ (Gartzke, 2007; Mousseau, 2000; 2009; 2013), the ‘territorial peace’ (Gibler 2010), or 
‘political similarity’ (Bennett, 2006; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 
2002; Werner, 2000), such work has done little overall to undermine the broad acceptance of the 
basic empirical regularity. If there is any substantial weakness in the extensive literature on the 
subject, it is not belief in the empirical finding itself, so much as providing a fully convincing 
causal logic to explain it (Rosato, 2003). What is it about democracy that makes it less likely to 
engage in conflict with other democracies? This daunting puzzle still remains subject to a lively 
and inconclusive debate (Hegre, 2014). 
In this paper, we reopen and advance this debate by arguing that several different forms of 
constraint on power holders help to explain why democracies are less likely to enter into conflict 
with each other. In doing so, we also advance the democratic peace agenda on the measurement 
side. Whereas the vast majority of studies have relied on Polity to capture the degree of 
democracy among states, we propose a test with new data from the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) project, which we argue has both better concept-measurement consistency and also 
allow for disaggregation of the composite concept of ‘democracy.’ V-Dem contains a large 
number of disaggregated democracy indicators have been collected from more than 2,600 
country experts from 173 countries across the globe from 1900-2010. Using these, we show that 
three different mechanisms of accountability – horizontal, formal vertical, and informal vertical – 
all restrain democracies from fighting with each other. Horizontal accountability refers to the 
ability of other state institutions to constrain the actions of the executive. In democracies, formal 
vertical accountability is provided by the incumbent’s desire to remain in power, and thus an 
unwillingness to alienate the electorate in anticipation of the next election. Informal vertical 
accountability is provided by the ability of organized actors in civil society to inflict audience 
costs on the executive in-between elections, and to mobilize in support of opponents during 
elections. When pitting the three mechanisms of accountability against each other, we find the 
                                               
1 https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=17583492336353768752&as_sdt=40005&sciodt=0,10&hl=en and 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=3827946356775670036&as_sdt=40005&sciodt=0,10&hl=en (retrieved 
February 17, 2016). 
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weakest support for the formal vertical one. The democratic peace effect thus seems less to be a 
function of electoral pressures on executive incumbents than on the ability of other state 
institutions, as well as civil society actors, to constrain the executive.  
This has important implications for current theories of conflict initiation. Most importantly, 
it moves the state of theory beyond the traditional preoccupation with pitting “normative” 
against “structural” explanations for the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993). We argue 
that since structural constraints will have normative (or cultural) implications, these two versions 
of theory cannot be fruitfully contrasted with each other. The way forward is instead to 
disentangle what structural impediments (with probable downstream “normative” ramifications) 
most consistently constrain states from engaging in military conflict with each other. We advance 
this particular theoretical research agenda by moving beyond models solely concentrated on 
electoral accountability (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) or executive constraints (e.g., Choi 
2010) and instead examining both formal and informal paths of accountability, including interest 
advocacy practiced by civil society organizations. 
 
2. Retheorizing the mechanisms behind the democratic 
peace 
2.1  Prominent explanations of the democratic peace 
The most common explanations for the democratic peace are the ‘normative’ and the ‘structural’ 
(Maoz and Russett, 1993).2 Normative explanations hold that ‘the culture, perceptions, and 
practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of 
violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic 
countries as well’ (Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992, 576). States ‘externalize’ the domestic 
norms that encourage compromise solutions and reciprocity, and treat politics as more than a 
zero-sum game where losers are eliminated from future contests (Weart, 1998). ‘People within a 
democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live 
and let live; they respect the right to self-determination of those who are perceived as 
self-governing and hence not led easily into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite’ 
(Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992, 576). 
                                               
2 Other explanations are reviewed in Hegre (2014). These include the argument that democracies are better able to 
mobilize resources in war (Reiter and Stam, 1998), or to form alliances (Doyle, 1986), or that they have joint 
interests in international relations (Gartzke, 1998). The V-Dem dataset is not well suited to shed more light on these 
particular arguments. 
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Structural explanations start from the assumption that ‘international action in a democratic 
political system [except in emergencies] requires the mobilization of both general public opinion 
and of a variety of institutions that make up the system of government, such as the legislature, 
the political bureaucracies, and key interest groups’ (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626). Democratic 
leaders, then, must ensure that the interests of citizens and powerful organizations are taken into 
account. If they circumvent these constraints, democratic political leaders will face the prospect 
of removal from office (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., 1999). Debate, moreover, is public and decision-making is formalized, so information on 
the real costs of war is likely to enter the decision calculus. ‘[Democratic leaders] will not fear 
attack by another democracy. They will also know that institutional constraints, and the need for 
public debate in the other democracy, will prevent a surprise attack and so eliminate their own 
incentives to launch a preemptive strike” (Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992, 576–577).3  
Another insight related to such structural explanations is the ability of democracies to signal 
their intentions. Why is it that states are not able to agree to a solution that reflects the 
distribution of power and the actors’ intention or ‘resolve’, without incurring the costs of war 
(Fearon, 1995)? One answer is that if crisis escalation is not very costly, both parties have an 
incentive to exaggerate their power or resolve, mobilize, and then to back down when they 
realize the bluff is discovered. Fearon (1994) argues that audience costs – the costs that a leader 
suffers when backing down – lock leaders into their positions, increasing reputational costs if 
they are caught bluffing. He argues that democracies have higher audience costs and are thus 
more likely to credibly commit to policies that signal their intentions while avoiding the kind of 
behavior more likely to escalate a crisis.4 We find the logic of his argument compelling with 
regard to why the democratic peace is dyadic and not monadic. 
Although the behavioral mechanisms implied in the constraints and signaling explanations 
are somewhat different, they both rest on the idea that democracies have a set of 
institutionalized mechanisms through which leaders are held accountable for their actions 
(Rosato, 2003). Both leave considerable room to further specify the exact mechanisms that 
promote accountability. From the perspective of measurement, normative factors are harder to 
operationalize, especially for comprehensive global country-year samples for long periods of 
                                               
3 Also see Schweller (1992). 
4 Choi (2010) is one recent example of empirical support for the constraints explanation. Making use of various 
empirical strategies to distinguish the explanations, Schultz (1999) and Prins (2003) find stronger support for the 
signaling argument than for the constraints explanation. Weeks (2008) builds on this argument by showing that 
single-party regimes also exhibit behavior in line with a signaling argument. Downes and Sechser (2012), Snyder and 
Borghard (2011), and Trachtenberg (2012), on the other hand, find little empirical evidence for the audience cost 
argument. 
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time. It is maddeningly difficult as well to distinguish normative from structural explanations 
empirically because ‘norms of reciprocation and compromise’ over time become formalized as 
institutions, blurring the distinction between the two. The norms that arguably explain the 
democratic peace, according to Maoz and Russett, are embedded in ‘regulated political 
competition’ (1993, 625). Thus we both think it unlikely that there is anything like direct 
normative explanations disembodied from institutions. Hence, exploring what types of ‘regulated 
political competition’ are associated with interstate peace can be argued to represent 
institutionally embedded norms. For this reason, our contribution will focus on structural 
constraints, moving them out of the realm of theory, and using the depth of the indicators in the 
Variety of Democracy dataset to evaluate different causal pathways. 
 
2.2 Unpacking Constraint: Paths of Accountability 
We examine both horizontal and vertical accountability, critical components of democratic 
practice, brought to the fore in the study of democratic regime change by O’Donnell (1998). We 
also move beyond his understanding by examining both formal and informal paths of 
accountability. We understand the primary mechanism of accountability to be the ability of 
actors to sanction others in concrete relations of power. Like Lindberg (2013) we understand 
‘sanction’ in the full range of its positive and negative meanings in English, both to impose costs 
that can constrain unwanted behavior and to authorize actions in line with the rules of the game. 
Schedler (1999) adds to our understanding by not only emphasizing the ability to punish 
governmental officials who overstep their authority, but also the ability to call them to account – 
to oblige them to inform the public about their activities and to justify them. Thus, even those 
exercising authority completely under a rigorous system of rule of law face the prospect of 
incurring political costs for the policies that they pursue. 
We identify three principal paths of accountability: through the institutionalized mechanism 
of elections by which incumbents may be removed from power (formal vertical); through the 
checks and balances between different state institutions (formal horizontal); and through the costs 
imposed by the protests, publicity, and withdrawal of support provided by organized groups in 
civil society (informal vertical). 
 
Formal vertical accountability by electoral means 
In turning to vertical accountability we begin with the formal dimension, how the reiterated 
regular and competitive election of leaders creates responsiveness to the concerns of the 
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citizenry. Immanuel Kant (1795/1991) argued that the citizens of a (democratic) republic would 
hesitate before plunging into a war, for ‘this would mean calling down on themselves all the 
miseries of war’ (p. 100).5 Insensitivity to citizens’ preferences leads to sanctions by voters in the 
next round of elections and this promotes the accountability of elected officials to the electorate. 
The logic of this form of accountability is captured by Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999, 10): 
Governments are ‘accountable’ if citizens can discern representative from 
unrepresentative governments and can sanction them appropriately, retaining in 
office those incumbents who perform well and ousting from office those who do 
not. An ‘accountability mechanism’ is thus a map from the outcomes of actions 
(including messages that explain those actions) of public officials to sanctions by 
citizens. Elections are a ‘contingent renewal’ accountability mechanism, where the 
sanctions are to extend or not to extend the government’s tenure.  
This mechanism is a product of the relationship between leaders and the electorate. We use 
our conceptualization of electoral democracy to examine this potential causal linkage, drawing on 
a rich strand of democratic theory evolving from Schumpeter’s (2003/1942) classic definition, 
and, with the important addition of suffrage, more recently Munck’s (2009) minimalist 
conception of democracy (also see Boix, Miller and Rosato 2012). According to this 
conceptualization, electoral democracy embodies the core value of making rulers responsive to 
citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections, 
including minimal political rights (most importantly suffrage and the freedom to form multiple 
political parties) seen as prerequisites to the holding of meaningful elections.6 
The institutional explanations of the democratic peace most commonly refer to this electoral 
component or some version of it. Leaders that are perceived to conduct risky and unsuccessful 
international policies are either not elected in the first place, or removed after failure by the 
voters (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller, 1992; Fearon, 1994). The ability of voters to 
hold leaders accountable is thus key. This requires that ‘there are regular opportunities for 
democratic publics to remove elites who have not acted in their interests’ (Rosato, 2003). Since 
                                               
5 Kant (1795/1991) is the standard reference, but several other enlightenment theorists precede Kant in arguing 
that states founded on democratic principles must also be against war (Gates, Knutsen and Moses, 1996, 6–7). For a 
critique of the interpretation that Kant was a forerunner of modern democratic peace theory, see Jahn (2005); 
Franceschet (2000). 
6  Although famous for encompassing both inclusion and contestation, Dahl’s (1971) influential model of 
‘polyarchy’ is a more maximalist version of electoral democracy that also brings in more extensive political rights 
and civil liberties (most importantly freedom of organization, even going beyond multi-party elections, and freedom 
of expression). In our effort to tease out what specific mechanisms help explain the democratic peace, we do not 
rely on this broader conception in this paper but instead assess the more minimalist conception, both with and 
without suffrage (see below), and with the separate addition of media freedom (the latter however as a feature of 
horizontal accountability). 
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the electoral mechanism has received the most attention in efforts to explain the democratic 
peace, we expect to replicate the democratic peace finding when operationalizing this conception 
of democracy.  
V-Dem, moreover, for the first time allows for a systematic investigation of what component 
parts of electoral democracy are most important for explaining this outcome. We have strong 
theoretical expectations in this regard. Knowing that universal suffrage, as well as the 
introduction of nominal executive elections or presidential plebiscites, have been widely 
practiced in single-party and even personalist dictatorships with rigged elections and strong state 
repression (Hermet, Rose, and Rouquie 1978), we deduce that only those elements present in 
democracy and absent in plecibiscitary dictatorship should explain the democratic peace – 
namely free and fair elections under multiparty competition. 
 
Formal horizontal accountability through institutional checks and balances 
The second mechanism we explore is horizontal accountability. According to O’Donnell (1998, 
117): ‘This kind of accountability depends on the existence of state agencies that are legally 
empowered – and factually willing and able – to take actions ranging from routine oversight to 
criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to possibly unlawful actions or omissions by other 
agencies of the state.’ Merkel (2004, 41) elaborates on the positive aspects of this form of 
accountability: ‘elected authorities are surveyed by a network of relatively autonomous 
institutions and may be pinned down to constitutionally defined lawful action’. He understands 
this as a set of reciprocal checks between the executive, legislature, and judicial organs that both 
respect the constitutional responsibilities of each but which constrains the actions of each to 
those which they are lawfully empowered to discharge. The existence of horizontal 
accountability renders democracy into a self-equilibrating system where actors are compelled to 
abide by the rules of the game due to the potential sanctions that other players can levy, either 
withholding permission or imposing costs. This is primarily achieved through effective legislative 
and judicial checks on executive power. 
This conception featured in Doyle’s (1983a; 1983b) highly influential argument about the 
‘liberal peace.’ The ‘liberal’ component has also often been invoked in other studies attempting 
to explain the democratic peace (Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992). The mechanism most clearly 
articulated seems to be that strong constraints on the executive ensure that decision-making 
takes time and that the real costs of the policies are (at least better) taken into account. This 
mechanism is elaborated on in Choi (2010)’s application of legislative veto-player theory to the 
understanding of international conflict. He builds on Tsebelis’ insight that dense networks of 
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veto players enhance policy stability, thus impeding rash decisions to enter into conflict (1995, 
293). Such liberal-peace arguments imply that it is horizontal accountability between key 
governmental institutions that matters for peace. 
Horizontal accountability is finally also said to be promoted by the media because of its 
indispensability in enabling other actors to track and understand the actions of those in power 
(Rosato, 2003). This is because the media are a primary source of information for voters at 
election time as well as for citizens engaged in civil society organizations. It is also an alternative 
information source for those exercising countervailing power in the state. Thus responding to 
the flow of public information is a major concern for political incumbents. The degree to which 
press and media freedom is impeded, makes it more difficult to exercise constraint over political 
leaders and other decision-makers or even sometimes to have a full understanding of the actions 
they are taking (Voltmer, 2009; Hutchings, 2005; Semetko 2009). 
 
Informal vertical accountability by civic action 
The third mechanism we highlight is non-electoral vertical accountability, a pathway that has not 
received much attention in explanations of the democratic peace. Whereas formal accountability 
is exercised through elections or in their anticipation, there are mechanisms of citizen 
engagement that can impose audience costs on leaders in informal ways between elections. Here 
we draw inspiration from participatory notions of democracy, which received considerable 
attention in democratic theory particularly in the 1970s and 1980s (Pateman, 1970; Macpherson, 
1977; Barber, 1984; Gould, 1988). This tradition primarily emphasizes citizen engagement and 
non-electoral forms of political participation through civil-society organizations (both advocacy 
and protest). 
The formal vertical accountability provided by regular elections is uneven and periodic; it is 
enhanced in the final stages of the electoral cycle when incumbents and challengers vie for 
power. As Merkel notes (2004, 38): ‘At most, voters only have continuing control in so far as a 
circumspect politician, aiming to get re-elected, might align their manner of governing to the 
wishes of the voters.’ Here we expand notions of vertical accountability into the informal realm. 
A number of authors conceive of the kind of interest advocacy practiced by civil society 
organizations as a more direct form of representation which can serve as an alternative path of 
accountability that supplements or in some instances supplants elected representation (Schmitter, 
1992; Peruzzotti, 2007; Fung and Wright, 2003; Dalton, Scarrow and Cain, 2003; Chalmers, 
Martin and Pister, 1997; Houtzager and Lavalle, 2010). 
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The widespread exclusion of the participatory component from the democratic peace 
literature omits one of two essential pathways by which democratic publics inflict audience costs 
on their leaders. Powerful civil society organizations provide citizens with other means to 
constrain leaders and the political establishment. Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000, 153) outline 
the mechanisms by which civil society organizations can promote accountability. These include 
protest mobilization against unpopular actions and policies, citizen-based monitoring and 
oversight of government agencies and officials, activist litigation in the courts, as well as 
alternative sources of publicity about government actions. Ekiert and Kubik (1999, 9) go far to 
argue that the contentious action of civil society can be essential to establishing accountability 
where there are defects with other institutional domains such as party systems. In cases where 
elected officials are constrained by either secrecy or purposively practice it or ignore public 
opinion, popular mobilization may provide another institutional means to constrain leaders by 
increasing their concerns about audience costs (Fearon, 1994). 
Table 1 summarizes the ways in which we argue that our three different forms of 
accountability tap into different mechanisms that could explain the connection between 
democracy and conflict. 
 
Table 1: Mechanisms of Democratic Accountability and How They Potentially Explain the Democratic Peace 
 
Mechanism 
 
Causal Pathway 
1. Formal Vertical Accountability via 
Elections  
Elected executive under conditions of clean, multiparty 
elections, and universal suffrage → government 
responsiveness to popular preferences via potential 
audience costs 
2. Horizontal Accountability via 
Countervailing Powers 
Judicial and legislative constraints on the executive under 
conditions of media freedom → constraints on arbitrary 
exercise of executive power 
3. Informal Vertical Accountability 
via Civil Society Activism 
Activism by civil society organizations (advocacy, protest, 
monitoring) → government responsiveness to popular 
preferences via potential audience costs 
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3. Research design 
Our research design is built on Hegre, Oneal and Russett (2010) that again are based on earlier 
studies of the democratic peace. Formulating the dyadic nature of the democratic peace is not 
straightforward. Most studies use Dixon’s (1994) ‘weak link’ assumption, and measure the 
relevant variable for the ‘least constrained’ country in the dyad. This is done on a 
variable-by-variable basis – a dyad is coded with the democracy score for the least democratic 
country in the dyad and with the trade-dependence score for the least trade-dependent of the 
two. As argued in Hegre (2009, 30), there is a fundamental problem with the weak-link 
procedure. In many cases, one of the two countries is the least democratic and the other of them 
the least trade-dependent. Which of the two countries is then the least constrained overall? 
We instead use a variation of the weak-link procedure proposed in Hegre (2008) that 
assumes that the strongest country in the dyad (in terms of military capabilities) always is the one 
that is ‘least constrained’. We refer to this country as country i and the weaker as j. Here, we 
enter the democracy score for the stronger country in the pair (called country i), that of the 
weaker country (j), and the multiplicative interaction term between the two (ij). If the dyadic 
democratic peace holds, the interaction term should be negative – the risk of interstate 
militarized conflict decreases as both countries become more democratic. We use similar 
constructions for the control variables in the models.7 
 
3.1  Dependent variable: Fatal MIDs 
The dependent variable is the onset of ‘fatal MIDs’ – militarized interstate disputes that lead to 
the death of at least one person. We use the MID v4.1 version (Palmer et al., 2015) to extend the 
dyadic MID dataset (Maoz, 2005) up to 2010. In combination with the V-Dem data, this allows 
us to study the 1900-2010 time period. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 To ascertain that our results are robust to alternative specifications, we also in report in Appendix Table A-5 
results with the traditional weak-link formulation to reproduce the main results (using the interaction specification 
for the control variables). The substantial conclusions from these models are similar to the ones from our preferred 
specification. AIC scores in the ‘traditional’ specification are in general much higher than the corresponding scores 
in our preferred specification. 
 12 
3.2  Main Independent Variables 
The vast majority of studies on the democratic peace since Bremer (1992) have relied on the 
Polity dataset to operationalize the concept of democracy.8 There are many good reasons for 
this choice. Among the major datasets that measure democracy, Polity is the most extensive in 
terms of its coverage across time. In conjunction with the COW data this allows findings to be 
based on the population of states (save for micro-states) in the global system from the 
post-Napoleonic period to the present. 
Polity has been to some extent amenable to disaggregating certain aspects of democracy to 
examine which of its properties are responsible for the pacific nature of democratic dyads. Choi 
(2013) for example has used it effectively to show that one prominent component, executive 
constraint (xconst), is a potential cause.9 However, Polity is not particularly amenable to more 
fine-grained disaggregation that will allow us to pinpoint the ways in which political 
accountability works to enhance peace. 
This is in part due to the fact that Eckstein and Gurr did not initially set out to explicitly 
understand and measure democracy, but patterns of authority (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975).10 
Despite the conceptual origins of the project, Gurr was able to adapt the taxonomy to 
distinguish the three classic Polity-based regime types – democracy, anocracy and autocracy. 
However, his conceptualization of democracy at that stage – ‘the presence of multiple 
institutionalized centers of power, some of which are open to widespread citizen participation’ 
stands as relatively underspecified from the perspective of modern comparative politics (Gurr, 
1974, 1487). This contrasts with autocracy, which monopolizes power in one center and 
anocracy, which is under-institutionalized. 
This work was further elaborated and validated in Jaggers and Gurr (1995) where they specify 
three dimensions of democracy: 1) ‘the presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,’ 2) 
‘institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power,’ and 3) ‘guarantee of civil 
liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and actors of political participation’ (p. 471). Yet there is 
                                               
8 Several earlier studies relied on other, dichotomous indicators of democracy (e.g. Babst, 1964; Small and Singer, 
1976; Doyle, 1986), and Rummel (1983) used the Freedom House data. 
9 Choi argues that we need to look at the impact of structural and normative factors, and is most interested in the 
interaction between executive constraint as the former and rule of law as the latter. We would see both of these as 
properties of democratic institutions and structural. In his base model executive constraint is also significant on its 
own (p. 267). 
10 This original theoretical work on the project yielded a 479-page volume in which the term ‘democracy’ is 
referenced in the index on thirteen pages, whereas ‘authority’ merits references on over 200 pages (Eckstein and 
Gurr, 1975). 
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little discussion of how the five indicators used in tabulating the 21-point polity scores match up 
to these dimensions. Clearly effective expression of preferences is related to how competitive 
and regulated political participation is (five points and two points respectively), but they are not 
coterminous. There is a preponderance of information about the chief executive here – 
competitiveness of recruitment (four points), openness of recruitment (two points), and 
constraints on the chief executive (seven points), perhaps even too much, as Gleditsch and Ward 
(1997) have pointed out. Finally, there are no direct measures of civil liberties here at all.  
In this article, we instead apply the framework of the V-Dem project to improve our 
understanding of various ways democratic political systems allow both other members of the 
elite embedded in countervailing centers of institutional power and the citizenry to constrain 
decision makers. We disaggregate what is meant by constraint using the concept of 
accountability as measured by the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al., 2011, 2016b; 
Lindberg et al., 2014). While not as extensive over time as Polity, it covers 173 different 
countries since 1900 and has an unprecedented conceptual depth that allows for democracy to 
be considered as a variety of aggregates and to examine the effect of its component parts. 
The V-Dem data are collected from country experts, mostly academics from each country, 
through questions with well-defined response categories or measurement scales. These experts 
are recruited based on their academic or other credentials as field experts in the area they code, 
as well as on their seriousness of purpose and impartiality. The questionnaire is subdivided into 
11 different areas of expertise, and most experts code a cluster of three such areas. The target is 
that at least 5 experts rate each indicator for each country and year going back to 1900. This 
means that more than 2,600 experts in all have participated in gathering the data. The 
individual-level expert ratings are aggregated to country-year scores using a Bayesian item 
response theory (IRT) measurement model (see Pemstein et al, 2015). This model produces a 
latent variable estimate for each expert-coded indicator after taking varying rater thresholds and 
coder reliability (precision) into account. Since most coders rate one country only in areas based 
on their expertise, V-Dem also utilizes ‘lateral’ coders who rate multiple countries for a limited 
time period, as well as ‘bridge’ coders who code the full time series for more than one country. 
Essentially, this mitigates the potential incomparability of coders’ thresholds and enhances 
cross-national comparability (Coppedge et al., 2016c). 
In this paper we will primarily draw on five different indices of constraint, one for vertical 
electoral accountability (also decomposed into one sub-index and one indicator), three for 
horizontal, and one for vertical non-electoral accountability. Before presenting these, we would 
like to highlight two inferential problems that will limit our ability to draw firm conclusions 
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about the relative importance of different mechanisms of constraint. The first is the fact, also 
illustrated below, that all indices are modestly to strongly inter-correlated. Due to 
multicollinearity, it is thus difficult to discern the effect of one of them while controlling for the 
others. Second, lacking a model for how the accountability mechanisms might affect each other, 
we can only base our inferences on estimates of direct effects. To the extent that some 
constraints (such as electoral democracy) are the prime movers of all the others, their indirect 
effects will thus be omitted. 
 
Electoral accountability 
Following Munck (2009), this is an index of electoral accountability based on four components: 
1) an elected executive (v2x_accex, a multiplicative index based on 12 indicators), 2) clean 
elections (v2xel_frefair, a Bayesian Factor Analysis (BFA) index based on 8 indicators), 3) 
multiparty elections (v2x_multiparty, a BFA index based on four indicators), and 4) universal 
suffrage (v2x_suffr, which is a single indicator).11 To capture the notion that each of these 
components is a necessary condition, and that the overall level of electoral accountability works 
as a chain defined by its weakest link, the four components are aggregated into an overall index 
through multiplication (v2x_munck). In order to tease out the extent to which suffrage plays an 
independent role in explaining the democratic peace, we also rely on an index only based on only 
the first three components. This index more closely follows Schumpeter’s (2003/1942) 
influential minimalist definition of democracy, where suffrage was never explicitly made part of 
the definition.12 When this Schumpeterian index of electoral accountability is used, we control 
separately for the extension of the suffrage. 
We construct three variables from the electoral accountability index: Electoral accountabilityi is 
the index for the stronger country in the dyad, Electoral accountabilityj that for the weaker. Electoral 
accountabilityij is the product of Electoral accountabilityi and Electoral accountabilityj. All indices are 
scaled to range from 0 to 1. We make similar constructions from the other country-level 
variables. 
 
                                               
11 See the V-Dem codebook (Coppedge et al., 2016a) for detailed information on all indicators referred to here. 
12 Although not a binary indicator, this even more minimalist Schumpeterian conception of electoral democracy is 
conceptually very similar to the Przeworski et al. (2000) measure of democracy. 
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Legislative constraints on the executive 
This and the following index measure the existence of effective checks that limit the use of 
executive power. In terms of the V-Dem indicators, legislative constraints on the executive 
(v2x_legcon) is based on the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of indicators 
tapping into (a) the extent to which the legislature questions officials in practice, (b) exercises 
executive oversight, (c) investigates the executive in practice, and (d) whether legislature 
opposition are able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the 
governing party or coalition.13 
 
Judicial constraints on the executive 
This index (v2x_jucon) is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis 
model of indicators tapping into (a) whether the executive respects the constitution, and whether 
the executive complies with important decisions of both (b) the high court and (c) lower courts 
with which it disagrees; as well as how often the (d) high court and (e) lower courts make 
decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record 
(judicial independence). To ameliorate multicollinearity concerns, we also include a more general 
index of executive constraints by simply taking the average of the legislative and judicial 
constrains indices (v2x_execon).  
 
Media freedom 
This index (v2x_mefree) is formed by taking the first principle component of the indicators 
tapping into the extent of (a) print/broadcast censorship effort, (b) harassment of journalists, (c) 
media bias against opposition parties, (d) media self-censorship when reporting on issues that the 
government considers politically sensitive, (e) criticism of the government among the major print 
and broadcast outlets, and (f) how wide a range of political perspectives the major print and 
broadcast media represent. 
 
Civil society participation 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor 
unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social 
                                               
13 If v2x_legcon is missing information we assume the legislature is missing entirely and set v2x_legcon to 0. 
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movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations. The 
index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the 
indicators tapping into (a) whether civil society influences the legislative candidate nomination 
within party organization through decentralization or party primaries, (b) whether major CSOs 
are routinely consulted by policymakers, (c) how extensive is the involvement of citizens in the 
network of CSOs, and (d) CSO women’s participation.14 
 
Mapping constraint 
The five indicators of constraint are highly correlated with each other. For the year 2010, the 
indicators are correlated at 0.77 or higher (see Appendix Figure A-1).15 In 2010, the civil society 
participation and media freedom indices are somewhat distinct from the three formal indices of 
constraint. The scatterplots in Figure 1 show how the legislative constraint (left) and civil society 
participation (right) relate to the electoral accountability index.  
 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of legislative constraint index vs. electoral accountability index (left) and civil society 
participation index vs. electoral accountability index (right), 2010 
 
 
Longstanding, consolidated democracies typically have high values for all these indicators, 
such as Great Britain (GBR) or Italy (ITA). Likewise, clearly authoritarian regimes such as Cuba 
(CUB) or Qatar (QAT) have low values for each. A large number of emerging democracies 
display much more heterogeneous patterns of constraint. Countries like Venezuela (VEN), 
Guyana (GUY), and Ecuador (ECU) have weak legislative constraints on the executive 
                                               
14 If v2x_cspart is missing information we imputed the value based on the v2cscnsult, v2csprtcpt, and v2csgender 
indicators. 
15 For earlier years, these correlations are considerably lower. 
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compared to electoral accountability. Other countries, such as Iran (IRN), Kenya (KEN), and 
Tanzania (TAZ) have strong legislative checks on executive power. Civil society participation 
differs from electoral accountability following a different pattern. It is clearly weakest in those 
political systems that have almost no electoral accountability, such as in North Korea (PRK) and 
Turkmenistan (TKM). Non-competitive electoral systems, such as Morocco (MAR) and Vietnam 
(VNM), are less repressive of civil society. Among those countries with higher levels of electoral 
accountability there is considerable variation in how participatory civil society is. Ghana (GHA), 
for instance, scores much higher than Turkey (TUR) in 2010.  
 
Figure 2. Global trends in the five indices of constraint and the V-Dem Polyarchy index, 1900—2012. 
Non-weighted country averages. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows global trends in the indices of constraint, demonstrating another dimension of 
differences between them. The (unweighted) global average for the electoral accountability index 
(v2x_munck) increased steadily from close to 0 to about 0.4 as political liberties were extended in 
most countries in the world. The civil society participation index has also increased steadily 
throughout the 20th century and beyond. The indices of horizontal constraints (legislative and 
judicial), on the other hand have changed little from 1900 up to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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in 1990.16 All indices increased markedly after the end of the Cold war, and have increased in 
parallel over the past 25 years. If the democratic peace depends mostly on the vertical 
accountability mechanisms, Figure 2 indicates that it has strengthened considerably over the past 
century. If it draws strength mainly from the horizontal accountability mechanism, this 
deepening mainly occurred after the Cold war.  
 
3.3  Other Variables 
Polity: We also present results using democracy data from the Polity dataset (Jaggers and Gurr, 
1995; Marshall, n.d.) for comparison. The V-Dem Polyarchy index and the Polity2 index are 
highly correlated (at about 0.84), but differ in some important respects. In general, the V-Dem 
index displays a stronger increasing trend over time than Polity, in part since it reflects the 
extension of suffrage much better than Polity.17  
 Military capabilities: The COW military capabilities index (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972) is 
based on data on states’ total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel 
production, military expenditures, and size of the armed forces. The COW project calculated 
each state’s share of the world’s total for each of these sub-indices. The CINC index is 
constructed as the unweighted average of each of these shares. The theoretical range for the 
index is [0, 1]. In log form, the capabilities index lnMi ranges from −11.5 to −0.957. 
Population size: The population variables lnPij are the natural log of total population in 
thousands for countries i and j. The variable originates from the Correlates of War military 
capabilities dataset. Military capabilities are strongly correlated with population size – populous 
countries like the US and China are powerful countries. When controlling for population size, 
the capabilities index shifts interpretation to the effect of per-capita capabilities, which is highly 
correlated with GDP per capita. 
 Direct contiguity: Contiguity takes the value 1 if two states either share a land boundary or are 
separated by less than 240 kilometers of water. 
 Distance: Distance is the great-circle distance between the two states’ capitals (or major ports 
for the USA, the USSR/Russia, and Canada). 
                                               
16 The indices for each country have increased somewhat over the period, but in aggregate these trends were 
counteracted by the entry of new and less democratic political systems following decolonialization. 
17 Consequently, in 1930 none of the political systems that Polity give the maximum score of 10 is given a V-Dem 
Polyarchy score above 0.84. In 2012, countries that Polity regards as maximally democratic obtain a score of 0.89 on 
average. There is still considerable variation among what Polity codes as close to maximally democratic. France, the 
US and the UK score high on the Polyarchy index, whereas Hungary and Israel have relatively low scores. 
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System size: Raknerud and Hegre (1997, 390–91) show that in dyadic studies, the probability of 
dispute for ‘low-relevance’ dyads must be dependent on the number of states in the system. We 
enter the log of the number of independent states in the year of observation to account for this.18 
Proximity of War: Raknerud and Hegre (1997) and Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) argue that 
temporal dependence in BTSCS designs may be handled by adding a function of time since 
previous conflict in the dyad to the set of explanatory variables. We use the decay function 
suggested by Raknerud and Hegre (1997) here. Proximity of war is defined as 2(-py/a) where py is 
the number of years since last conflict and a a half-life parameter. We set a =1, assuming that 
the risk-increasing effect of a previous war is halved every year. 
 
4. Results 
We estimated two sets of models for all pairs of states for every year over the 1900–2010 period 
with the democratic peace hypothesis represented as the democracy score(s) of the stronger 
country, that of the weaker country, the interaction of these two, and several control variables. In 
the first set of models, we entered the five indicators of constraint one by one along with our 
control variables. Figure 3 summarizes the results from these models. Complete estimation 
results in table form with all control variables are found in Appendix Table A-1.  
The first model (called ‘Electoral accountability’) enters the three terms based on the 
electoral accountability index along with control variables. The estimates from this model are 
printed in green color at the top of the figure. The points represent the estimates and the 
whiskers their estimated 95% confidence interval. The two main terms are both positive, 
although that for the weaker country is not statistically significant. The interaction between the 
index values for the two countries in the dyad, on the other hand, is negative and highly 
significant – when both countries score highly in terms of electoral accountability, the risk of 
fatal dispute is much lower than if either have low scores. In line with expectations, we show in 
Appendix Table A-3 that the effect of electoral democracy is driven by the “Schumpeterian” 
core dimensions tapping into contestation – whereas suffrage does not play an independent role 
in promoting peace. 
The second model enters the ‘Legislative constraints’ index terms. Again, the interaction term 
is negative and significant, whereas the main terms are positive and significant. Similar patterns 
are observed for the other three individual indicators. 
                                               
18 See Raknerud and Hegre (1997) for a detailed justification of this specification. 
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Figure 3. Coefficient estimates, models with the indices of constraint entered individually 
 
Figure created using the Stata coefplot package (Jann, 2014). Complete estimates for these 
models are reported in Appendix Table A-1 (columns 1–5). 
 
Figure 4 shows that the net effect for each of these indicators is consistent with the 
democratic peace. In the left panels, the dashed line plots the estimated log odds of a MID when 
the weaker country j is at the mean of the index, as a function of the score for the stronger 
country (along the x-axis). The metric for the y-axis is log odds relative to the case where both 
countries have scores of 0 for the index. The dotted and solid lines show the same when the 
index is one standard deviation below or above the mean.19  
 
                                               
19 The mean here is the average value for the index across all countries for all years 1900–2010. All other variables 
are assumed to have values zero. 
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Figure 4. Risk of fatal MID as a function of the individual indicators of constraint 
 
 
The figures to the left show estimated log odds of fatal MIDs as a function of the indicator value 
of the stronger country, varying the value for the weaker country. The dashed lines show this 
relationship when the relevant index for the weaker country is at the mean; the dotted lines when 
the index for the weaker country is one standard deviation below the mean, the solid lines when 
the index for the weaker country is one standard deviation above the mean. The figures to the 
right shows the marginal effect of a two standard-deviation increase in the indicator score of the 
weaker country as a function of the indicator value for the stronger county. Figures to the right 
were created using the intgph package (Zelner 2009, Tomz et al. 2003), and based on the 
reduced sample described in the main text. 
 
The graph on the right plots the marginal effect of this relationship – it shows the change in 
the estimated probability of a fatal dispute when comparing a pair of countries where the weaker 
country has a value for the index one standard deviation below the mean and one standard 
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deviation above, respectively, as a function of the index for the stronger country. Both these 
graphs show a clear dyadic democratic peace in terms of all our indices of constraint – a more 
democratic weaker country means a clearly lower risk of fatal MID if the stronger country is 
relatively democratic.20 
All of our individual indicators of constraint reflect the democratic peace when entered on 
their own. Given the high correlation between them, however, each of them may serve as a 
proxy for one of the other. We investigate which of them are relatively most important along 
two routes.  
The first is to estimate models with all the individual terms entered simultaneously. In Figure 
5, we show the results of a model that contains all terms.21 The electoral accountability index 
terms are not distinguishable from 0 in this model, and the media freedom index also loses most 
of its explanatory power in the joint model. The legislative and judicial constraint variables, on 
the other hand, retain separate contributions to the democratic peace. Both interaction terms are 
negative and the legislative constraint at least borderline significant.22 The variable that retains 
the most of its impact on the probability of a fatal dispute is the civil society participation index. 
The democratic peace seems to rest in particular on horizontal constraints on the executive and 
the presence (and acceptance) of strong and active civil society organizations.  
The second route is to compare the models in terms of their overall fit to the data. A set of 
different metrics is reported in Table 2 for the six models reported in Figures 3 and 5 as well as 
some additional models we present below. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for 
each model discussed so far are reported in the ‘AICfull’ column. The ‘Civil Society’ model has 
the lowest AIC values, indicating as above that this variable provides the best fit within the 
estimation sample. The table also reports how well the different models do in terms of 
out-of-sample predictive performance.23 To obtain these estimates, we first reduced the size of 
our dataset by removing at random 95% of all the non-MID dyad years.24 We then drew half of 
all dyads at random, estimated the models on this sample, obtained predictions for the 
non-estimation sample and compared with the actual record of fatal MIDs for the 
non-estimation sample. We repeated this for 20 independently sampled divisions of the sample. 
                                               
20 That we have plotted the democracy score of the stronger country along the x axis rather than that of the weaker 
country is inconsequential – plots where the stronger and weaker country switch place look very similar. 
21 Complete estimation results in table form with all control variables are found in Appendix Table A-1, column 6. 
22 We also show in table A-3 that the combined juducial and legislative constraints index also has a negative and a 
statistically significant effect when eneter alongside all other constrain variables.  
23 See Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010) for an argument for why this is a necessary complement to standard 
significance testing. 
24 The results from this asymmetrically reduced model are shown in Appendix Table A-2. Only the intercept terms 
change substantially compared to Table A-1. 
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The ‘AICoos’ column in Table 2 show the average AICs for the 20 reduced-sample estimations. 
The ‘AUROC’ and ‘Brier’ columns show the Area Under the Receiver Operator Curve and the 
Brier scores averaged over the 20 samples. Models that predict well will have high scores on the 
AUROC and low Brier scores. In what follows, we place more emphasis on the Brier scores 
since the AUROC is tends to favor models that predict non-conflict well rather than models that 
also predict conflict. 
 
Figure 5. Coefficient estimates, models with the indices of constraint entered jointly 
Figure created using the Stata coefplot package (Jann, 2014). Complete estimates for this model 
are reported in Appendix Table A-1 (model 6). 
 
The out-of-sample evaluation of predictive performance further strengthens the impression 
that constraint through the electoral accountability mechanism is weaker than the other four. 
The AUROC is lower and the Brier higher for this model than for the other models. The 
out-of-sample evaluation indicates that the ‘judicial constraints’ and ‘civil society’ perform the 
best. The ‘media freedom’ model has a high area under the ROC curve, but a relatively poor 
Brier score. The model including all the five indicators performs considerably better than the five 
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models in Figure 3 across all metrics, suggesting that the conclusions drawn from Figure 5 are 
still valid.  
 
Table 2. Model summary statistics 
 Model    AICfull   
 
AICoos   
 
AUROC    Brier   N    
Electoral 
accountability 1 5945.7 766.9 0.9356 0.06588 541560 
Legislative 
constraint 2 5917.9 742.4 0.9378 0.06451 541560 
Judicial constraint 3 5882.2 742.2 0.9388 0.06371 541560 
Media freedom  4 5876.4 753.8 0.9412 0.06384 541560 
Civil society index  5 5854.5 756.2 0.9379 0.06290 541560 
All entered jointly  6 5808.3 737.3 0.9416 0.06175 541560 
Polity  7 5894.6 736.5 0.9402 0.06434 541560 
Polyarchy  8 5885.3 733.5 0.9395 0.06378 541560 
Liberal democracy  9 5852.3 742.2 0.9407 0.06232 541560 
Participatory 
democracy 10 5882.6 758.6 0.9362 0.06325 541560 
Deliberative 
democracy 11 5886.2 774.1 0.9395 0.06384 541560 
Egalitarian 
democracy 12 5899.1 746.5 0.9369 0.06392 541560 
Schumpeter  13 5916.4 744.8 0.9372 0.06521 541560 
Horizontal 
constraint  14 5873.3 713.0 0.9401 0.06297 541560 
Lean civil society 15 5929.9 780.9 0.9348 0.06489 541560 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the implications of the electoral accountability model (model 1) compared 
to the joint constraint model (model 6) for selected dyads in 2010. For each pair of countries, we 
calculated how much the “democraticness” of their institutions alter the risk (measured as log 
odds) of conflict relative to what is explained by the control variables. We plot the effect of the 
electoral accountability model along the horizontal axis and that of the joint constraint model 
along the vertical one. Democratic pairs such as Great Britain and India (IND-GBR) have a low 
risk of conflict according to both models and are located in the lower left corner.25 Pairs with 
one democracy and one non-democracy such as Great Britain and North Korea (GBR-PRK) 
                                               
25 This result is in line with the studies on “political similarity” (Peceny, Beer & Sanchez-Terry 2002; Raknerud & 
Hegre 1997). 
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have a high risk and are found in the upper right one. The diagonal line represents the case 
where the two models yield similar predicted effects. 
 
Figure 6. Predicted effect of institutional setup for risk of conflict, electoral accountability (model 1) and joint 
constraint (model 6), selected dyads, 2010 
 
The figure shows how much the indices of constraint change log odds of conflict for each dyad 
relative to what is predicted by the control variables in the model. The values along the x axis are 
the sums b1xi + b2xj + b3xij where xi is the electoral accountability index value for country i, xj 
the value for country j, xij the interaction term, and the b terms the corresponding from the 
electoral accountability model. The values along the y axis are constructed in a similar way for all 
the index of constraint terms in the joint constraint model. 
 
The figure shows that models that reflect multiple dimensions of accountability give a more 
nuanced picture of interstate conflict risk. The electoral accountability model indicates that 
autocracies such as North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Myanmar have equally high risk of conflict 
with democracies. The joint constraint model distinguish much better between them – the 
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predicted risk of conflict between GBR and North Korea is twice as high as between GBR and 
Myanmar.26 
Our results suggest that the democratic peace rests less on formal vertical mechanisms of 
electoral accountability than on horizontal and informal vertical constraint. Illiberal democracies, 
hybrid regimes, and electoral authoritarian regimes such as Turkey and Venezuela in 2010 
continue to hold competitive elections but harass civil society organizations and undermine 
horizontal constraints on their ambitious executives. The joint constraint model indicates that 
the pairs of countries they form are more bellicose than the electoral accountability model 
suggests. The difference in the predictions from the two models is less marked for Venezuela 
than for Turkey, however, since V-Dem regards Venezuela to have a much stronger civil society 
in 2010. 
Similarly, a number of weaker at risk democracies, such as Kenya or Tanzania, despite their 
low level of vertical electoral accountability should have a lower risk of conflict with other 
democracies than these two illiberal examples. Pairs of countries including Ghana or Tanzania, 
for instance, score relatively better on civil society participation than on electoral accountability. 
Figure 6 shows that these pairs have very low predicted risk of conflict by the joint constraint 
model, but are placed close to the middle by the electoral model.  
By implication, the vast expansion of electoral accountability during the 20th century 
demonstrated in Figure 3 may have considerably less positive implications for international peace 
than the steady improvement in all five indices of constraint seen from 1990 and onwards.  
For comparison with more conventional democratic peace investigations, we also estimated a 
set of models using the five standardized V-Dem indices of democracy as well as with the Polity 
index of democracy. The detailed results are found in Appendix Table A-4, and the model 
summary statistics are reported in Table 2. The democratic peace is supported no matter which 
index we are using – the interaction term is negative and significant in each of them. The model 
summary statistics in Table 2 suggest they perform less well than our theoretically derived 
institutions of constraint, however.  
Confirming the impression that horizontal accountability is more important than the vertical, 
the V-Dem Polyarchy index (that focus in particular on the vertical aspect of democracy) 
performs worse than the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index (LDI), that captures the more 
horizontal forms of constraint that more liberal democracies enjoy. The model using the LDI 
                                               
26 The predicted change in log odds due to the electoral accountability model (the sum  1xi +  2xj +  3xij) is 2.05 
for GBR-PRK and 1.19 for GBR-MMR. The predicted odds ratio is 2.36, the exponential of the difference between 
these two. Since these are rare events, the ratio of predicted probabilities are very close to this figure. 
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has AIC, AUROC, and Brier values that are better than the five single-indicator models. The 
three other V-Dem indices fit the data (within and out of sample) roughly as well as the 
Polyarchy index. The Polity index has the poorest performance in terms of AIC and Brier. None 
of the models based on these standard one-dimensional indices perform nearly as well as the 
model with all five indices of constraint entered jointly. Figure A-2 shows that the predictions 
from the Polity model resemble those from our electoral accountability model. 
Table 2 also report the results from three models with alternative operationalizations of our 
indices of constraint. In the “Schumpeter” model, we use the minimalist measure described 
above, controlling for the extent of suffrage. This operationalization of the `formal vertical’ 
democratic peace fits the data better than the more extensive one, but still not as well as the 
horizontal and informal vertical ones (models 3, 4, 6, and 7). We also merged the legislative and 
judiciary indices of constraint into one joint `horizontal constraint’ index. As was clear from 
Figure 5, the two indices of formal horizontal constraint pull in the same direction, so the joint 
indicator makes for a more parsimonious and effective model. Finally, we estimate a model with 
a much leaner version of the civil-society participation index, omitting information on civil 
society input on nominations, civil society consultation, and women’s participation in civil 
society organizations. The model using the lean civil society measure performs less well than our 
preferred corresponding metric, but still better than the electoral accountability model. 
  
5. Conclusion 
In this article we have introduced two novelties into the study of the democratic peace. First, we 
make use of the V-Dem data and demonstrate that it improves on Polity, the dominant measure 
in that literature, along at least two dimensions. First, V-Dem has a superior concept-to- 
measurement consistency, given its starting point was the overt modeling of democracy. 
Moreover, the V-Dem data are vastly more detailed than Polity, allowing us to operationalize 
much more precise theoretical mechanisms than the simpler datasets. Accordingly, our fit tests 
show that our V-Dem-based indices model the democratic peace much better than Polity, both 
in terms of in-sample goodness of fit and out-of-sample predictive performance.  
Second, and more importantly, we have identified a subset of the multiplicity of democracy’s 
attributes that seem to explain its ability to deter war-like behavior. Specifically we show that, 
when entered individually, electoral accountability, judicial and legislative constraints on the 
executive, media freedom and civil society participation promote the democratic peace, when 
controlling for the other standard determinants of inter-state disputes. When pitted against each 
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other, however, only horizontal constraints on the executive and civil society participation 
continue to have a direct effect on dyadic peace. We thus find most consistent support for the 
horizontal and informal-vertical accountability mechanisms underlying the democratic peace. 
Earlier we cited the claim of Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) that ‘the mobilization of … general 
public opinion’ matters at the same order of importance as the ‘variety of institutions that make 
up the system of government’. Our findings provide support for the institutional side of their 
claims but to some extent contradict what they say about social mobilization. We confirm 
important aspects of earlier work on the democratic peace such as Doyle’s (1983a,b) ‘liberal 
peace’ argument and Choi’s (2010) focus on legislative veto players. However, our results on the 
role of civil society suggest that social mobilization is also important. The exclusion of the 
peace-making role of civil society in this literature may well be a function of the past paucity of 
data to measure it. Given the strong model fit and predictive performance of the models that 
include this new V-Dem variable, this omission has been an important oversight in the literature 
from the perspective of our constraint-based theorization of the mechanisms behind the 
democratic peace. 
At first sight, the policy implication of these findings would seem clear: in order to promote 
international security, what needs strengthening is not electoral competitiveness or the quality of 
elections but horizontal mechanisms of effective constraints on the executive, a more vibrant 
civil society that monitors and constrains those exercising executive power, or a combination of 
the two. If the goal is order in the international system, legislative and judicial reforms should 
trump electoral reform, and the promotion of the initiatives of an organized and active citizenry 
in civil society seems more important than the strengthening of opposition political parties. 
However, in as much as the mechanism of electoral accountability is connected to these other 
aspects of democracy, it cannot be easily dismissed from a policy agenda to promote peace. Most 
importantly, it cannot be ruled out that the promotion of electoral accountability is also a way of 
strengthening the other accountability mechanisms. Students of judicial independence and 
oversight, for example, tend to stress the logic of the “insurance argument”, which holds that 
competitiveness at the polls undergirds executive support for judicial constraints by creating 
uncertainty about the future prospects of staying in office (for an overview, see Vanberg 2015). 
Similarly, to the extent that the state can constrain and harass civil society, the strength of civil 
society is arguably not simply an independent source of its own but is guaranteed by the sort of 
robust competition at the polls that protects the freedoms of association and expression that 
civil society requires. 
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Despite our reticence to completely reject the impact of electoral accountability, we still 
believe we have moved the democratic peace literature forward by stressing the stronger relative 
importance of the non-electoral mechanisms of accountability. The essence of constraint is 
preventing those who exercise executive power from acting in an arbitrary and ill-advised 
fashion, leading to destructive forms of interstate conflict. The electoral mechanism does 
determine who holds executive office, but its constraining power is time dependent, tied to the 
elections cycle. Both the vertical constraining power of civil society and horizontal constraints 
posed the countervailing powers of the legislative and judicial branches of government are not 
dependent on the timing of elections, but consistent over time. This plausibly helps to explain 
why they are a more effective constraint on the kinds of arbitrary executive action that pose a 
threat to peace than the constraints posed by threat of losing office in the future. 
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Appendix 
Figure A-1. Scatterplots showing correlations between the five indices of accountability as well as the V-Dem 
Polyarchy/Electoral democracy index, 2010. 
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Figure A-2. Predicted effect of institutional setup for risk of conflict, Polity and joint constraint model, selected 
dyads, 2010
 
The figure shows how much the indices of constraint change log odds of conflict for each dyad 
relative to what is predicted by the control variables in the model. The values along the x axis are 
the sums b1xi + b2xj + b3xij where xi is the Polity index value for country i, xj the value for country j, 
xij the interaction term, and the b terms the corresponding from the Polity model. The values 
along the y axis are constructed in a similar way for all the index of constraint terms in the joint 
constraint model.     
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Table A-1. Estimation results, models with the five indices of constraint entered separately (columns 1–5) and 
jointly (column 6). Full sample. 
 1 Electoral 
accountability 
2 Legislative 
constraints 
3 Judicial 
constraints 
4 Media 
freedom 
5 Civil society 
index 
6 Joint 
constraint 
mzfatal_new       
Electoral accountability, stronger 0.638**     0.0370 
 (2.84)     (0.10) 
Electoral accountability, weaker 0.195     0.312 
 (0.77)     (0.69) 
Electoral accountability, int. -4.122***     0.406 
 (-5.79)     (0.42) 
Legislative constraints, stronger  1.425***    0.794 
  (4.58)    (1.57) 
Legislative constraints, weaker  1.116***    2.334*** 
  (3.82)    (3.74) 
Legislative constraints, int.  -4.492***    -1.600 
  (-7.90)    (-1.61) 
Judicial constraints, stronger   1.681***   0.782 
   (4.00)   (1.31) 
Judicial constraints, weaker   0.815*   -0.432 
   (2.40)   (-0.95) 
Judicial constraints, int.   -4.486***   -1.731* 
   (-6.86)   (-2.15) 
Media freedom, stronger    1.328***  -0.922 
    (4.40)  (-1.26) 
Media freedom, weaker    0.771**  -1.488* 
    (2.85)  (-2.19) 
Media freedom, int.    -4.099***  0.753 
    (-7.66)  (0.74) 
Civil society index, stronger     2.018*** 1.670* 
     (4.64) (2.06) 
Civil society index, weaker     1.401*** 0.792 
     (3.69) (0.99) 
Civil society index, int.     -6.092*** -4.186** 
     (-7.72) (-2.84) 
Log CINC score, stronger 0.0502 0.0923 0.120 0.113 0.0803 0.110 
 (0.58) (1.01) (1.31) (1.20) (0.93) (1.16) 
Loc CINC score, weaker 0.375*** 0.370*** 0.418*** 0.346*** 0.336*** 0.325*** 
 (4.34) (4.09) (4.40) (3.66) (3.71) (3.47) 
Log population, stronger 0.199* 0.142 0.121 0.137 0.169 0.143 
 (2.04) (1.33) (1.08) (1.27) (1.69) (1.19) 
Log population, weaker 0.106 0.124 0.0515 0.146 0.159 0.149 
 (0.99) (1.07) (0.42) (1.21) (1.41) (1.30) 
Direct contiguity 1.096*** 1.032*** 0.907*** 1.040*** 1.195*** 0.956*** 
 (4.54) (4.29) (3.72) (4.13) (4.90) (3.59) 
Log distance, ports -0.719*** -0.764*** -0.770*** -0.742*** -0.756*** -0.790*** 
 (-8.50) (-8.66) (-8.96) (-8.71) (-8.77) (-9.15) 
Log system size -0.637*** -0.658*** -0.744*** -0.659*** -0.533*** -0.688*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.49) (-5.21) (-4.26) (-3.68) (-4.26) 
Peace years 2.437*** 2.474*** 2.431*** 2.450*** 2.435*** 2.389*** 
 (17.01) (17.21) (17.29) (17.32) (17.18) (17.09) 
Constant -3.562 -2.683 -0.455 -2.918 -4.227 -3.009 
 (-1.71) (-1.04) (-0.16) (-1.09) (-1.86) (-1.06) 
Observations 541560 541560 541560 541560 541560 541560 
AIC 5945.7 5917.9 5882.2 5876.4 5854.5 5808.3 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A-2. Estimation results, models with the five indices of constraint entered separately (columns 1–5) and 
jointly (column 6). Reduced sample: for computational reasons, we removed at random 95% of all the non-MID 
dyad years but retained all the MID dyad years. 
 1 Electoral 
accountability 
2 Legislative 
constraints 
3 Judicial 
constraints 
4 Media 
freedom 
5 Civil society 
index 
6 Joint 
constraint 
mzfatal_new       
Electoral accountability, 
stronger 
0.592*     -0.0836 
 (2.23)     (-0.19) 
Electoral accountability, 
weaker 
0.00416     0.0800 
 (0.02)     (0.18) 
Electoral accountability, int. -3.827***     1.275 
 (-5.11)     (1.23) 
Legislative constraints, 
stronger 
 1.567***    1.113 
  (4.56)    (1.92) 
Legislative constraints, 
weaker 
 1.120***    2.556*** 
  (3.42)    (4.06) 
Legislative constraints, int.  -4.930***    -2.405* 
  (-7.40)    (-2.25) 
Judicial constraints, stronger   1.690***   0.767 
   (3.84)   (1.21) 
Judicial constraints, weaker   0.694   -0.487 
   (1.82)   (-0.93) 
Judicial constraints, int.   -4.775***   -2.022* 
   (-6.47)   (-2.23) 
Media freedom, stronger    1.319***  -0.911 
    (3.79)  (-1.18) 
Media freedom, weaker    0.674*  -1.173 
    (2.09)  (-1.63) 
Media freedom, int.    -4.245***  0.237 
    (-6.81)  (0.22) 
Civil society index, stronger     2.052*** 1.668* 
     (4.48) (2.17) 
Civil society index, weaker     1.292** 0.545 
     (3.17) (0.66) 
Civil society index, int.     -6.233*** -3.652* 
     (-7.09) (-2.44) 
Log CINC score, stronger 0.102 0.140 0.165 0.157 0.0960 0.131 
 (1.13) (1.58) (1.86) (1.71) (1.10) (1.40) 
Loc CINC score, weaker 0.378*** 0.370*** 0.455*** 0.360*** 0.329*** 0.356*** 
 (4.06) (4.09) (4.86) (3.87) (3.64) (3.75) 
Log population, stronger 0.167 0.107 0.103 0.111 0.170 0.145 
 (1.62) (1.07) (0.99) (1.06) (1.68) (1.25) 
Log population, weaker 0.0907 0.109 -0.0185 0.111 0.149 0.0862 
 (0.80) (0.98) (-0.16) (0.97) (1.33) (0.74) 
Direct contiguity 1.093*** 1.041*** 0.873*** 1.025*** 1.182*** 0.933** 
 (4.31) (4.13) (3.48) (3.91) (4.55) (3.29) 
Log distance, ports -0.782*** -0.816*** -0.850*** -0.798*** -0.809*** -0.855*** 
 (-9.28) (-9.78) (-10.40) (-9.46) (-9.72) (-10.29) 
Log system size -0.607*** -0.653*** -0.741*** -0.658*** -0.531*** -0.713*** 
 (-3.75) (-4.30) (-4.97) (-4.06) (-3.39) (-4.12) 
Peace years 2.101*** 2.088*** 2.069*** 2.108*** 2.076*** 2.048*** 
 (10.96) (11.34) (11.71) (11.75) (11.40) (11.36) 
Constant 1.023 1.828 5.172* 1.915 -0.561 1.793 
 (0.42) (0.78) (2.12) (0.79) (-0.24) (0.70) 
Observations 27547 27547 27547 27547 27547 27547 
AIC 3133.9 3096.5 3060.5 3062.8 3050.9 3007.4 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A-3. Estimation results, models estimated to assess robustness. Reduced sample. 
 13 Schumpeter 14 Horizontal 
constraints 
15 Lean civil 
society 
mzfatal_new    
Schumpeterian accountability, stronger 0.449   
 (1.77)   
Schumpeterian accountability, weaker -0.239   
 (-0.92)   
Schumpeterian accountability, int. -3.919***   
 (-5.50)   
Suffrage, stronger -0.871   
 (-1.23)   
Suffrage, weaker -0.0997   
 (-0.15)   
Suffrage, interaction 1.273   
 (1.57)   
Executive constraints, stronger  2.153***  
  (4.94)  
Executive constraints, weaker  1.297***  
  (3.30)  
Executive constraints, int.  -6.160***  
  (-7.46)  
Media freedom, stronger    
    
Media freedom, weaker    
    
Media freedom, int.    
    
Civil society index, stronger    
    
Civil society index, weaker    
    
Civil society index, int.    
    
Lean civil society index, stronger   -0.0907* 
   (-2.11) 
Lean civil society index, weaker   -0.239*** 
   (-5.47) 
Lean civil society index, int.   -0.143*** 
   (-5.42) 
Log CINC score, stronger 0.179 0.143 0.0900 
 (1.91) (1.61) (0.99) 
Loc CINC score, weaker 0.451*** 0.429*** 0.293** 
 (4.51) (4.69) (3.11) 
Log population, stronger 0.0843 0.109 0.166 
 (0.79) (1.07) (1.61) 
Log population, weaker -0.0138 0.0240 0.188 
 (-0.11) (0.21) (1.63) 
Direct contiguity 0.993*** 0.948*** 0.988*** 
 (3.69) (3.74) (3.74) 
Log distance, ports -0.769*** -0.840*** -0.788*** 
 (-9.17) (-10.30) (-9.20) 
Log system size -0.703*** -0.719*** -0.690*** 
 (-4.13) (-4.79) (-4.45) 
Peace years 2.089*** 2.071*** 2.104*** 
 (11.16) (11.70) (11.82) 
Constant 4.912 3.731 -1.108 
 (1.85) (1.58) (-0.46) 
Observations 27547 27547 27547 
AIC 3106.3 3053.4 3113.1 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A-4. Estimation results, models using Polity and the five standard V-Dem indices of democracy entered 
separately (columns 1–5). Reduced sample. 
 
7 Polity 8 Polyarchy 9 Liberal 
democracy 
10 Participatory 
democracy 
11 Deliberative 
democracy 
12 Egalitarian 
democracy 
mzfatal_new       
Polity score, stronger -0.0347***      
 (-3.35)      
Polity score, weaker -0.0605***      
 (-5.56)      
Polity score, interaction -0.00874***      
 (-6.44)      
Polyarchy index, stronger  1.578***     
  (3.72)     
Polyarchy index, weaker  0.830*     
  (2.01)     
Polyarchy index, interaction  -6.664***     
  (-5.81)     
HLI liberal index, stronger   1.765***    
   (3.96)    
HLI liberal index, weaker   0.735    
   (1.78)    
HLI liberal index, interaction   -10.95***    
   (-5.25)    
HLI participatory index, stronger    1.809**   
    (3.25)   
HLI participatory index, weaker    0.716   
    (1.41)   
HLI participatory index, interaction    -13.66***   
    (-5.45)   
HLI deliberative index, stronger     1.035**  
     (2.93)  
HLI deliberative index, weaker     0.221  
     (0.66)  
HLI deliberative index, interaction     -8.163***  
     (-5.17)  
HLI egalitarian index, stronger      1.769*** 
      (3.41) 
HLI egalitarian index, weaker      0.788 
      (1.53) 
HLI egalitarian index, interaction      -9.797*** 
      (-5.31) 
Log CINC score, stronger 0.154 0.141 0.135 0.130 0.128 0.162 
 (1.71) (1.58) (1.51) (1.47) (1.43) (1.70) 
Loc CINC score, weaker 0.373*** 0.367*** 0.416*** 0.378*** 0.391*** 0.436*** 
 (4.23) (4.11) (4.58) (4.21) (4.27) (4.54) 
Log population, stronger 0.117 0.122 0.127 0.134 0.142 0.124 
 (1.13) (1.20) (1.22) (1.31) (1.38) (1.15) 
Log population, weaker 0.109 0.108 0.0432 0.0974 0.0847 0.0321 
 (0.99) (0.98) (0.39) (0.89) (0.75) (0.28) 
Direct contiguity 1.098*** 1.148*** 1.083*** 1.138*** 1.161*** 1.193*** 
 (4.30) (4.62) (4.33) (4.55) (4.63) (4.71) 
Log distance, ports -0.793*** -0.810*** -0.835*** -0.812*** -0.797*** -0.849*** 
 (-9.44) (-9.56) (-10.06) (-9.77) (-9.54) (-9.91) 
Log system size -0.616*** -0.532*** -0.587*** -0.534*** -0.545*** -0.458** 
 (-3.87) (-3.39) (-3.81) (-3.46) (-3.48) (-2.81) 
Peace years 2.144*** 2.092*** 2.066*** 2.052*** 2.063*** 2.053*** 
 (11.44) (11.03) (11.17) (11.07) (10.88) (10.48) 
Constant 1.714 1.652 3.197 1.756 1.830 3.658 
 (0.74) (0.69) (1.36) (0.74) (0.78) (1.49) 
Observations 27547 27547 27547 27547 27547 27547 
AIC 3080.6 3084.6 3048.9 3080.9 3082.6 3089.4 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A-5. Estimation results, models using traditional ‘weak-link’ construction. Full sample 
 
 
1 Electoral 
accountability 
2 Legislative 
constraints 
3 Judicial 
constraints 
4 Media 
freedom) 
5 Civil 
society index 
6 Joint 
constraint 
mzfatal_new 
      Electoral accountability lower -2.949*** 
    
-0.399 
 
(-6.46) 
    
(-0.69) 
Electoral accountability higher 0.412* 
    
0.232 
 
(2.27) 
    
(0.78) 
Legislative constraints lower 
 
-2.261*** 
   
0.691 
  
(-7.55) 
   
(1.45) 
Legislative constraints higher 
 
0.768*** 
   
1.340** 
  
(3.29)  
  
(3.08) 
Judicial constraints lower 
  
-2.310*** 
  
-1.187** 
   
(-7.40) 
  
(-3.02) 
Judicial contraints higher 
  
0.554* 
  
-0.119 
   
(2.02) 
  
(-0.28) 
Media freedom lower 
   
-2.275*** 
 
-0.170 
 
   
(-7.92) 
 
(-0.29) 
Media freedom higher 
   
0.478* 
 
-1.039 
    
(2.24) 
 
(-1.85) 
Civil society index lower 
    
-3.200*** -2.500*** 
     
(-9.64) (-3.42) 
Civil society index higher 
    
0.860*** 0.544 
     
(3.30) (1.04) 
Log CINC score, stronger 0.0973 0.0941 0.123 0.0915 0.0762 0.0823 
 
(1.02) (0.97) (1.25) (0.94) (0.83) (0.89) 
Loc CINC score, weaker 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.333*** 0.295** 0.255** 0.266** 
 
(3.66) (3.56) (3.49) (3.09) (2.81) (2.93) 
Log population, stronger 0.148 0.125 0.0872 0.148 0.162 0.142 
 
(1.43) (1.14) (0.73) (1.33) (1.54) (1.27) 
Log population, weaker 0.169 0.179 0.154 0.201 0.251* 0.232* 
 
(1.57) (1.52) (1.22) (1.63) (2.18) (2.05) 
Direct contiguity 1.103*** 0.999*** 0.898*** 0.972*** 1.121*** 0.978*** 
 
(4.54) (4.07) (3.54) (3.75) (4.46) (3.65) 
Log distance, ports -0.735*** -0.758*** -0.757*** -0.746*** -0.772*** -0.783*** 
 
(-8.71) (-8.62) (-8.32) (-8.85) (-8.88) (-8.84) 
Log system size -0.619*** -0.682*** -0.751*** -0.694*** -0.569*** -0.670*** 
 
(-3.95) (-4.44) (-4.99) (-4.18) (-3.70) (-4.06) 
Peace years 2.450*** 2.492*** 2.472*** 2.472*** 2.474*** 2.427*** 
 
(17.02) (17.10) (16.64) (16.98) (16.97) (16.72) 
Constant -3.643 -3.210 -1.581 -3.886 -5.200* -4.140 
 
(-1.71) (-1.24) (-0.53) (-1.44) (-2.19) (-1.55) 
N 541560 541560 541560 541560 541560 541560 
AIC 5942.3 5941.9 5922.2 5909.0 5874.2 5845.5 
t statistics in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Traditional ‘weak-link’ construction of dyadic variables: Terms labelled ‘lower’ contain the lowest value among the two countries in the dyad for the 
given variable. Terms labelled ‘higher’ contain the higher value in the dyad. 
 
 
